The QE deception, and lies of ‘economy’

Quantitative Easing – (Artificial Sustension)


The QE deception, and lies of “economy”

A typical controlled media article on QE.

Quantitative easing?
The aim of QE is to kick-start economic growth. The European Central Bank is set to announce action this week aimed at stimulating the troubled eurozone economy in the face of deflation and recession. Unlike central banks in the United States and Britain, the ECB has so far resisted implementing a programme of buying government bonds. That is the process known as quantitative easing. However, Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, is expected to outline the action the ECB will take at its monthly board meeting later on Thursday.

What is QE?
QE is aimed at stimulating economic activity, such as increasing consumer spending

Central banks usually try to increase the amount of lending and activity in the economy indirectly by cutting interest rates. Lower interest rates encourage people or companies to spend money, rather than save. But when interest rates can go no lower, the only other option is to pump money into the economy directly.

This process, known as quantitative easing or QE, occurs when a central bank buys assets, usually government bonds, with money it has “printed” – or created electronically these days. The central bank buys bonds from investors such as banks or pension funds using this “new” money, which increases the amount of cash in the financial system.

Why is the ECB taking action now?
Growth in the economies of many countries in the eurozone – referring to the 19 countries that use the euro – has slowed down in recent months, while some are in recession. Further, Europe is facing the spectre of deflation – when prices fall, rather than rise – after the inflation rate fell below zero in December. Deflation alarms economists because it can quickly become a downward spiral that is difficult to stop as consumers delay purchases in the hope that prices will fall further. Earlier this month, the World Bank warned that the eurozone risked sliding into permanent stagnation. The ECB has been under pressure for some time to take action but has faced intense political resistance from Germany in particular. However, it is now widely felt that action is needed – notwithstanding the potential economic benefit from the slide in oil prices.

Have other central banks tried QE?
The Bank of Japan was the first to deploy QE in the 1990s . Both the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve embarked on QE in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis in an attempt to stimulate economic growth, as well as slashing interest rates. QE was first attempted by Japan’s central bank to arrest a period of deflation following its financial turmoil in the 1990s. There is disagreement about whether the initiative had the intended effect of stimulating the Japanese economy.

Has QE worked elsewhere?
A Bank of England report estimated that the £200bn ($300bn) worth of bonds it bought between March and November 2009 helped to increase the UK’s annual economic output by between 1.5% and 2%. That meant the effects of the programme had been “economically significant”, the Bank concluded. Since starting QE in 2008, the Federal Reserve has bought bonds worth $3.7 trillion, increasing its holdings eight-fold. The US central bank said in November that it would end its programme of asset purchases because its targets for inflation and reducing unemployment were on track to be met. However, there remain concerns about the long-term impact of the United States’ persistently low inflation rate.

Will it work in the eurozone?
Greece has been plagued by anti-austerity protests and fears about its financial system. The jury’s still out, but the most significant effect of action by the ECB could be to bring confidence to markets. With Greek elections in a few days and, ECB bond-buying could support confidence elsewhere in other troubled eurozone members and prevent any fallout from Greece affecting other countries. After five years of economic austerity, most pollsters say the Greeks are poised to reject the EU-imposed cost-cutting and vote for Syriza , which rejects the fiscal crackdown The idea is that if the ECB is buying bonds from countries such as Italy, as well as those from stronger members such as Germany, markets have little reason to sell such bonds in a rush even if the economic situation in Greece worsens.

Are there any losers from QE?
QE pushes up the market price of government bonds and reduces the yield paid out to investors. This is one reason why UK company pension scheme deficits have increased sharply in recent years. That is because the cost of paying pensions from final-salary schemes is calculated on the assumption that all their assets are invested in bonds. As the yield on bonds has fallen, so the stock of assets needed to generate the same level of pension income has gone up.


QE Exposed

What is “artificial sustention?”
Given that only legitimate credit-worthiness justifies the perpetual lending necessary to maintain a vital circulation subject to interest, and further given that the perpetual re-borrowing of interest and principal as subsequent debt (principal) inherently multiplies the sum of debt in proportion to a vital circulation… a system subject to interest inherently terminates itself by eventually engendering a sum of debt which exceeds the capacity of the circulation to service it.

Because usury can only prey upon a living host, in the late stages of this finite lifespan therefore, the intention to perpetuate usury is compelled to resort to artificial means for temporarily sustaining an interest-bearing monetary system beyond its legitimate capacity to sustain itself against its own, inherent, terminal multiplication of debt. Effectively then, artificial sustention is to break the rules of the system so that sufficient, unaccountable streams of money infuse the system with some capacity to continue servicing private debt, while of course the same unaccountable stream of circulation is only consumed in the continued servicing of private debt, to the sole benefit of the perpetrators of the imposed system. While artificial sustention artificially extends the lifespan of the system beyond the terminal conditions it imposes upon itself, artificial sustention ultimately comprises at the same time, a way both to extend peak volumes of usury and to publish money almost directly into the pockets of perpetrators and servants tied to their purse strings.

According to the designs of usury, the perpetually processed money of usury comes into existence upon virtually costless creation, whereupon it is loaned into circulation at falsely asserted risk, which purportedly justifies the initial and perpetually multiplying costs of interest, manifested in the escalating, eventually terminal indebtedness engendered by maintaining a vital circulation.

While the real risk to the purported central bank is no more than the publishing costs of the currency, and while this is typically recouped at great unearned profit from the first payment, hypocritically nonetheless, a necessary facade of diligence exists, which, to certify the purported risk that an incredibly profitable monetary obligation be fulfilled, establishes the credit-worthiness of the debtor, who is uniformly denied credit should they fail to meet the rising costs of servicing the multiplying sum of debt. While multiplication of debt by interest itself makes it ever more impossible to meet periodic principal and interest obligations engendered by the ever greater sums of debt, denial of credit — or due, vital circulation — upon failure to meet the artificially lofty standards of credit-worthiness, drives the subject sea of debtors to produce ever more, to borrow ever more, to service such sums of debt that they receive ever less of their own production.

As all this multiplies the sum of debt in proportion to a circulation, in the end of the finite lifespan of a monetary system subject to usury, the debtors struggle merely to tread water, as the costs of servicing the multiplying sum of debt come to exceed them. At the threshold of systemic failure under these maximum loads of usury, artificial measures can temporarily extend the lifespan of the failing system — with the notable and substantial motivations being to evoke a facade that there is no culpability, to perpetuate the necessary false impression (in the face of works such as this) that any magnitude of debt is magically sustainable, and not only to sustain usury, but to sustain usury across a period marked predominantly by peak volumes of unearned taking by usury.

Because the terminal stages of usury destroy the credit-worthiness of private subjects to maintain a vital circulation, if some other means of replenishing the circulation were not devised, the system would deflate in its natural manifestation of collapse, as the subjects paid their last revenue out of circulation, incapable of borrowing further. Necessarily then, artificial sustention involves replenishing a circulation by accumulating further debt which the subject system is in fact unfit to service. In other words, in the final stages of usury, usurers are compelled to issue credit which the central banking system cannot truly hope to recoup directly from the debtor. Instead, this stream of unaccountable credit sustains the vaster sum of private debtors to service their exceeding sum of debt, that the system can for the while continue.

Artificial sustention therefore is a pouring of money into the system as necessary to maintain a deception of seeming vitality in the face of an artificially extended period of maximum volumes of usury.

Because suspicious or determinably adverse events raise warning flags within republics, it is reckless for usurers of republics to grant such unworthy streams of credit to private entities, because this would be to tell each and every one of us that so flawed is the system that we must break its previously hard and fast rules so that we can go on paying again and again, three houses for the one home we hope some day to own.

The nature of the beast nonetheless is excessive wont, and to acquire by all the unjustifiable devices it can make available to itself; and so to perpetuate the whole network of usury’s purse strings, unaccountable credit is dedicated to the various needs of the beast as a whole, even by indirect conduits which naturally reinforce usury’s wealth and power.

To sustain the deception of vitality in a purported securities market for instance, vast streams of undue credit may be spent to give the illusion that usurers see to a duty of maintaining vitality — while in fact their very purpose is such multiplication of indebtedness as compromised the environment so that otherwise sustainable ventures are put at such obvious risks of non-survival as compromise the purported value of the securities. While being the cause even of perpetually escalating compromise, thus again and again the usurers pretend to come to the rescue of the facade — in the process, publishing money at virtually no cost, and making themselves so the owners of yet ever more vast expanses of our industry.

Similarly, as middlemen to the central bank fail when the curtain falls on sustainability, rescues at taxpayer expense extend the crime and retain its essential infrastructure despite a whole lack of public mandate for either the original crime or its consequence.

For their risks of raising public perception and reaction, these are less desirable manifestations of artificial sustention. The more subtle and principal conduit of artificial sustention therefore is unserviced accumulation of federal debt. Even while no foreseeable or practical way of paying down further federal debt can exist to a society itself jeopardized to maximum extents by private indebtedness, perpetual accumulation of insoluble federal debt props up the facade that usury is sustainable, by effectively pouring into a system which is perpetually deflating itself in the process of servicing terminal sums of debt, whatever money is necessary to replenish the circulation.
Federal indebtedness therefore is the primary means of artificial sustention.


As predicated by the purposes of usury, artificial sustention purposely evades addressing the cause of inherent multiplication of debt by interest. Instead, it merely compensates for the perpetual deflation of usury, by replenishing the system of such sums of currency as the subjects of the system are no longer fit to borrow, and by artificially excusing them from the obligation to service the perpetual stream of further federal debt.

Artificial sustention however can only work so long as escalation of redundant programs and escalation of already terminal sums of debt can match and reach the subjects of private debt in time to sustain their obligations to service it. Because vast sectors of natural industry can lay wholly outside the course of such revenues, artificial sustention is inherently impotent to perpetuate substantial vital sectors of an economy. Substantial bankruptcy, failure, and/or further escalation of private debt indicate that the practical limits of artificial sustention are exceeded, upon which the ultimate, terminal failure manifests upon every such self destructive system.

Obviously, only eradication of interest can solve inevitable collapse as a consequence of inherent multiplication of debt by interest. Particularly as this requires de-privatization of imposed systems of usury existing under the guise of “banking,” artificial sustention and evasion of solution together certify pervasive corruption and/or usurpation of purportedly representative government.

As the lifespan of the critical U.S. sector of usury approaches closure with highly probable, potentially catastrophic world-wide effects, it has regularly been asserted without qualification that “creating money out of thin air” is “inflationary,” as if somehow the inexpensiveness of the creation of tokens of value is destructive to their capacity to represent the wealth that money is naturally intended, by the subjects of a monetary system, to represent in perpetuation.

The advocates of this superstition however have never demonstrated either that we suffer inflation, or that the advantage of inexpensive tokens of value is factually destructive to the representative value of money.
On the contrary rather, purported Austrian “economists” actually advocate interest — even as the costs of servicing ever greater debt are the consequence of interest and singular systemic cause of rising prices, or devaluation of money. Furthermore, “Austrian economists” uniformly reject the idea of the very mathematic analysis which alone can ascertain a fact of inflation, or the cause of devaluation of the currency.

By definition nonetheless, neither creating money out of thin air or artificial sustention are inherently “inflationary.” After all, artificial sustention is invoked first for the need to make up for the constant deflation of usury, as we pay principal and interest obligations out of the general circulation, and secondly, for the fact multiplication of debt in proportion to the circulation has rendered us un-credit-worthy of maintaining the vital circulation by further borrowing.

If it weren’t for artificial sustention making up for circulatory inflation in the later stages of usury, the circulation would disappear from our payments of principal and interest obligations, and the system would realize its natural collapse.

By definition, a circulation is not inflated unless it exceeds the remaining value of the goods and services it is intended to represent. Thus we do not suffer an inflated circulation, because the current circulation is in fact far less than the existent value of wealth. On the contrary, we suffer a constricted, deflated circulation which makes it all the more difficult to sustain industry against its obligations to service debt; and which lends all the more to a probability of collapse.

Neither is the minimal cost of issuing money the cause of its devaluation. After all, in the beginning of the present lifespan, purportedly we enjoyed relative appreciation of the value of the dollar while the costs of publishing a dollar were even less than they are today.

On the contrary, inherent multiplication of debt by interest inherently devalues the circulation as it dedicates ever more of the circulation to servicing a sum of debt which is multiplied *in proportion to the circulation*. Systemically, only the costs of servicing the multiplying sum of debt drive up the costs of all production subject to multiplying indebtedness. The complained consequences therefore are inevitable ramifications of interest, which can be solved only by eradication of interest.

Imitators of these pages have wrongly deduced that to its end the pretended economy will follow the course it engenders. Racing off for borrowed reasons and credibility to project such failure, today we have such poorly substantiated projections of collapse all across the internet.

While we are to recognize not just the end, but the course of multiplication of debt however, realization of the end is not the lesson we are to take from studying projection models. Certainly of course, an intelligent public will be compelled instead to recognize and immediately adopt solution. But even when I first published the present thesis in 1979, and even when I provided the Reagan Administration with computer models which calculated multiplication of debt for plausible interest and growth scenarios, an obvious fact of the matters at hand was that such projections can only calculate when, left to its rules and ostensible administrative policy, such a system would collapse itself. While it is true that the central bank stood by, ineffective or unconcerned either to avert or arrest the long duration of first Great Depression, ultimately the goals of usury were to prevail by commencement of a subsequent lifespan.
The real question is why, in an ostensible republic, the faulted system was resumed rather than rectified — and why today as well, we are denied representation.

The comprehensive purpose of modeling or projection therefore is not to designate the date of failure, particularly as the date of failure can be long delayed by the whims of artificial sustention. Rather than to project a failure we recognize can be delayed artificially, the purpose of projection is to prove the adversities imposed by the un-assented system, and even to project phenomena such as artificial sustention, that we know the enemy and conditions we are up against. Certainly the record of these events is that nothing less will compel solution.

Even since the initial stages of the Reagan Administration, it was obvious that the system would be sustained artificially, at least by accumulating federal debt the renegade government would simply refrain from servicing. But it is utterly ignorant to simply project that the inherent failure of usury will transpire according to the un-manipulated dictates of the system, when securities markets can be bought/rescued for merely publishing money, and when already for decades, artificial sustention has even paved the way for otherwise intolerable rates of interest we could never otherwise have survived to now.

The lesson of projection and artificial sustention therefore is that indeed, the fact of artificial sustention itself proves the system otherwise engenders its own failure, and that therefore it is the intention of the ruling elite to preserve usury by all the designs of further events — or they would have allowed the perfection of economy already.

The purpose of artificial sustention therefore is to maintain a maximal volume of usury across an extended, artificial, otherwise-unattainable timespan, that in the purported end, in the name of rectitude, a “new” currency can impose upon you the same sustained consequences of escalated multiplication of debt.

From the beginning then, the purpose of artificial sustention is to deny you mathematically perfected economy™.


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